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OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE-REVOCATION OF OFFER BY SALE.

Frank et al. v. Stratford-Handcock et al., 77 Pacific Rep. 13.4
(Supreme Court of Wyoming, June 27, i9o4).

The point in the decision of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock
to be especially noted in this article is the revocation of an
offer by a sale of the property in question to a third party
with notice to the offeree of the sale. The facts, briefly, were
as follow: Frank, the defendant, entered into a written agreement with the plaintiff, Kent,--here represented by Stratford
and Handcock, her executors,--by which he agreed to lease
to Kent certain property for the term of six months. The
lease contained a clause giving Kent the right to purchase the
property within that time, and concluded with the provision
that the lessee (Kent) should deposit $5oo with Frank as
security for fulfillment of the lease and payment of rent.
This deposit was never made. Shortly after making the agree491
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ment Frank sold and conveyed the property in question to
one McKenzie. Kent remained in possession for several
months, until forcibly evicted by McKenzie. Before the expiration of the six months Kent tendered the purchase price to
Frank and demanded a deed, which was refused. This action
for specific performance of the contract and damages for taking
and withholding the property was then brought. The decision
of the court was in favor of Frank, the argument which was
used being as follows: Where no other consideration is stated
or shown, a lease containing a provision for such an option is,
together with the affirmative covenants of the lease, a sufficient consideration for the option. In this case, however,
there was a condition precedent to the lease becoming effective,
namely, the clause providing for a deposit of $5oo as security
for the fulfillment of the lease. As this deposit was never
made the lease never became operative, and the option or offer
was without consideration. It might, therefore, be withdrawn
at any time before acceptance, and the sale to McKenzie, of
which Kent had notice at the time she was evicted from the
property, and which occurred before her attempted acceptance,
amounted to a sufficient revocation.
The general and fundamental rule of revocation that "an
offer may be revoked at any time before acceptance" is so
elementary a part of the Law of Contracts that an explanation
of it, preliminary to the discussion of the point of this note, is
unnecessary. Another well-settled principle of law rules that
the revocation of an offer must be communicated or at least
brought to the knowledge of the offeree in order that it may
take effect, for the law holds that an offer must be considered
as continuing during every instant that it is being transmitted
and also during the reasonable period allowed for its acceptance, and that the offeree may so regard it until he has some
notice of its revocation. The case of Byrne v. Van Tienhoven,
L. R. 5 C. P. Div. 344, 188o, holds that " an uncommunicated
revocation is for all practical purposes and in point of law no
revocation at all. A state of mind not notified cannot be regarded in dealings between man and man." See also the
case of Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Insurance Co., 9 How. 390,
185o. At this point, however, and under the rule of law just
stated, arises the question, What is sufficient communication
or notice of the withdrawal of the offer that it may amount to a
good revocation? This is a question which admits of a rather
broad and complex answer owing to the varied circumstances
under which it may present itself. A partial answer is found
in the case under discussion and in the several parallel decisions, but as yet no complete answer has been obtained, for
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cases involving all these circumstances have not appeared for
settlement before our courts, and until they do arise certain
views of the question must remain undecided.
This uncertainty, of course, does not occur when the offer
is expressly revoked, either in words, or by post, or by telegraph, and a revocation thus brought to the knowledge of the
offeree before he has accepted the offer is an effectual revocation. In the case of Moffett v. City of Rochester, 178 U. S.
373, 1899, in which a clerical error in a bid for certain city
work was verbally corrected at the reading of the bid before the
city council, it was held that a subsequent acceptance of the
original bid did not create a contract. See also Wheat v.
Cross, 31 Md. 99, 1869.
There is an uncertainty, however, where the offeror does
an act inconsistent with his offer, indicating an intention to
revoke, as by sale of the property offered, but does not in any
way communicate his revocation. The question isr-Does the
knowledge of the offeror's intention to revoke his offer, not
coming from the offeror himself nor from any one authorized
by him, but from some other source, amount to a good revocation? To give an unqualified affirmative answer to this question would be to make a broad and sweeping statement for
the support of which it is impossible .to find any authoritative
cases; but on the other hand a negative answer is equally
impossible.
The point in the decision of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock
to be specially noted bears directly upon this, question. In
this case Frank clearly showed by his sale and conveyance of
the property in question to McKenzie that it was his intention
to revoke his offer to Kent. Kent received information of
this intention by means of a notice served by McKenzie, who
was neither a party to the original agreement between Frank
and Kent nor the authorized agent of Frank. The notice
came, therefore, from a third person who was neither acting
under the authority of the offeror nor was a party to the
original transaction. The court, as stated above, held that this
was a sufficient communication or notice of the offeror's revocation, and as it was received by the offeree before acceptance of
the offer, no contract consequently ever existed.
Directly in point with this decision is the well-known case of
Dickinson v. Dodds, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 463, 1876, The facts
in this case were as follows: Dodds gave to Dickinson a
written and signed memorandum in which he agreed to sell
to him a certain property, allowing him two days in which to
accept or refuse the offer. Before the expiration of the two
days Dodds sold the property to another party. Dickinson re-
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ceived notice of this sale through his agent, but the information
was not conveyed to him or to his agent through Dodds or any
one acting in Dodds' behalf. Dickinson tendered a written
acceptance, before the time allowed him to decide had expired,
which Dodds refused to receive. In his opinion James, L. J.,
said in part:
"It is said that the only mode in which Dodds could assert that
freedom was by actually and distinctly saying to Dickinson, 'Now, I
withdraw my offer.' It appears to me that there is neither principle
nor authority for the proposition that there must be an express and
actual withdrawal of the offer or what is called a retraction. It
must, to constitute a contract, appear that the two minds were one at
the same moment of time, that is, that there was an offer continuing
up to the time of the acceptance. If there was not such a continuing
offer, then the acceptance came to nothing."
Mellish, L. J., in affirming this opinion, said:
"I am clearly of the olinion that, just as when a man who has
made an offer dies before it is accepted it is impossible that it can be
accepted, so when once the person to whom the offer was made
knows that the property has been sold to some one else, it is too late
for him to accept the offer, and on that ground I am clearly of the
opinion that there was no binding contract for the sale of this property
by Dodds to Dickinson."
The leading American case supporting this principle is the
case of Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21, 1887. The facts
of this case were as follows: Applegarth allowed Coleman
an option on certain property, the option being unsupported
by any consideration, and then sold the property in question
to a third person before the expiration of the time allowed.
Coleman became aware of the sale, and tried to accept the
offer. The court held that, as the offer was without consideration, it might be withdrawn at any time before acceptance, and
the subsequent sale and transfer of the property by Applegarth to the third party, of which Coleman was aware, at
once revoked the offer.
The law as apparently laid down in these three cases,-Frank
v. Stratford-Handcock, Dickinson v. Dodds, and Coleman v.
Applegarth,-is that the knowledge of an inconsistent act done
by the offeror and not expressly communicated by him to the
offeree, but obtained by the offeree from some third party not
acting under the authority of nor in behalf of the offeror, is a
good revocation. To this, however, must be added the very
important qualification which was not brought out in any
of these cases mentioned, that in each instance no question
whatever was raised by the offeree as to the reliability or credibility of the information or notice received. In each case the
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offeree accepted the information of the sale as entirely trustworthy, and admitted that it was credible and that he believed
it. The law is yet to be determined, however, in those cases
where the offeree does not receive the information as being
credible and reliable and admit his belief in it, or where the
notice or news of the sale is received through some such
source as a newspaper, for no such cases have as yet arisen.
The law as stated in the decision of Dickinson v. Dodds
is questioned by Sir William Anson, the eminent English
authority on -the Law of Contracts (Principles of the English
Law of Contracts, 8th Amer. E., 4o), who states that "the
language used is wider than was needed to cover the facts of
the case." The ruling in this case seems to hold that the
knowledge of the offeror's intention to revoke, from whatever
source it reaches the offeree, is good notice of revocation, and
it is against this point that Sir William Anson directs his
criticism, although he does say: "It is easy to understand
that if the acceptor knew for a fact, though his information had
no authority from the offeror, that the offer was revoked, his
acceptance would not entitle him to specific performance of
the contract." Sir Frederick Pollock, however, agrees with
the decision in Dickinson v. Dodds (5th Ed. Pollock on Contracts 29), as does Mr. Benjamin in his Treatise on the Sale of
Personal Property (6th Amer. Ed. 5o). See also Little v.
Thurston, 58 Me. 86, 187o, Suber v. Pullin, I S. C. 273, 1869,
and Pomeroy on Specific Performance of Contracts, see. 61.
A review of the case of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock
appearing in the HarvardLaw Review, vol. xviii, no. 2, pages
139-14o, states that "the cases,"--Dickinson v. Dodds, Coleman v. Applegarth, and Frank v. Stratford-Handcock,-"test
the validity of the acceptance, for under modem practice equity
can award damages where it is impossible to grant specific
performance. This was not done, the court in each instance
granting no relief whatever, placing its decision on the broad
ground that the attempted acceptance, after knowledge of the
negotiation or sale, was ineffectual, and thaf no contract was
formed." The question of the validity of the acceptance seems
to have been decided, but the non-award of damages by the
court can hardly have been the test, for in but one of the three
above mentioned cases, Dickinson v. Dodds, were damages
sought. In the case of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock damages
were asked from the vendee for taking -and-withholding the
property from the offeree, but specific performance only was
sought from the vendor. In the case of Coleman v. Applegarth the bill prayed only for specific performance of the contract, no damages whatever being asked for. The cases do not,
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therefore, seem to bear out the statement that in each instance
the validity of the acceptance has been fully tested by the
failure of the court to award damages, for in but one instance
were damages asked for. This does not, however, affect the
rule that knowledge of the offeror's inconsistent act, obtained
in such manner and accepted by the offeree as credible and
trustworthy information, is a sufficient revocation of an offer.
In passing it might be well to note another point brought
out in the case of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock, namely, that
a provision or agreement in a lease granting to the lessee the
privilege of purchasing within a certain time is an option which
may not be revoked within the time allowed for its exercise;
and where no other consideration is expressed or shown, the
lease with its affirmative covenants is regarded as a sufficient
consideration to support the option. This principle is stated
in I Warvelle on Vendors, sec. 126, as follows:
"An optional agreement to convey, without any covenant or obligation to purchase, and without mutuality of remedy, will now be
enforced in equity if it is made upon proper consideration or forms
part of a lease or other contract between the parties that may be
true consideration for it."

The ground on which this principle rests is that in taking the
lease the lessee pays a higher rent provided the lessor gives
him the option of purchasing within a certain time. In the case
of Hall v. Center, 40 Cal. 63, 187o, in which a lease contained
a clause granting the privilege of purchasing on or before the
expiration of the term, it was held that the contract of the
lessors by which they covenanted that the lessee should have

the option to purchase or not at his election, was founded on
an adequate consideration, and should be enforced. In Willard
v. Taylae, 8 Wal. 557, 1869, Mr. Justice Field said:
"The covenant in the lease giving the right or option to purchase
the premises was in the nature of a continuing offer to sell, and
being under seal must be regarded as made upon a sufficient 9onsideration, and, therefore, one from which the defendant was not at
liberty to recede."

In accord: Hawralty v. Warren, i8 N. J., Eq. 124, .i866;
Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276, 1876; i8 Amer. and Eng.
Encyclopzedia of Law, 2nd Ed., 631. The option, however,
must comply with the general rules relative to agreements for
the sale of land, and if it is uncertain or indefinite, it will not
be enforced. I Warvelle on Vendors, sec. 126. Fogg v.
Price, i45 Mass. 513, 1888.
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The decision of Frank v. Stratford-Handcock is, therefore,
in accord with the more modem view of the law of revocation.
The law as laid down in this case is that a mere proposal,
unsupported by any consideration, creates no obligation whatever unless it is accepted according to its terms, and may be
revoked at any time before acceptance. And where an inconsistent act on the part of the offeror, showing that it is his
intention to revoke the offer, as by sale to a third party of
property offered, is brought to the knowledge of the holder
of such a voluntary option by some person not acting under
authority from nor in behalf of the offeror, and such information is accepted by the offeree, and admitted as credible and
trustworthy, such inconsistent act, of which the offeree has
knowledge, is a sufficient revocation of the offer, and the
knowledge of this act, thus received and accepted, is sufficient
notice or communication of the revocation to make it effective.

T.K.F.

